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Abstract: There is considerable cross-country variation in levels of household wealth and in 
wealth inequality. This paper assesses the extent to which these differences can be accounted 
for by differences in the distributions of households’ demographic and economic 
characteristics. A counterfactual decomposition analysis of micro data from five countries 
(Italy, UK, US, Sweden and Finland) is used to identify the effects of characteristics on 
component wealth holdings, their value and their distribution. The findings of the paper 
suggest that the biggest share of cross-country differences is not attributable to the 
distribution of household demographic and economic characteristics but rather reflect strong 
unexplained country effects.  
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1. Introduction 
The distribution of household wealth differs substantially across countries. In many instances 
the wealth inequality ranking of countries is very different from their respective ranking in 
terms of income inequality (Jäntti et al., 2008). A striking example of this is Sweden which, 
despite being one of the most equal countries in terms of income distribution, is ranked as 
one of the most unequal countries in terms of wealth. This paper examines the contribution of 
economic and demographic characteristics in explaining cross-country differences in the 
distribution of household wealth. 
 
There are several explanations for why country wealth and income inequality rankings may 
differ. Differences in institutional settings and economic environment will have a distinct 
effect on household wealth accumulation, over and above the impact of income, by affecting 
households’ saving motives and saving propensities. What the State provides in terms of 
education, health, housing and pensions will affect households’ needs and the incentives to 
accumulate private wealth holdings. Cross-country differences in the importance of past 
inheritances will contribute to the impact of the above-mentioned factors and in general the 
fact that wealth is a stock reflecting the historical financial well-being of households while 
income is a measure of current financial inflow of resources partly explain why discrepancies 
exist. Furthermore, variation in household wealth may reflect country-specific personal 
preferences (shaped by cultural and historical factors) for owning specific types and levels of 
assets and debts. Aside from these influences, cross-country differences in the distribution of 
household wealth may represent pure differences in the characteristics of households.  
 
Accordingly we focus on the contribution of age, household structure, labour market status, 
educational attainment and income. The analysis allows us to identify the importance of these 
factors in explaining cross-country differences in households’ wealth and the implications for 
explaining differences in household wealth inequality. The unexplained component will 
capture the effect of all unobserved differences including differences in welfare and tax 
systems and other institutional factors that affect how a given population with given 
characteristics accumulates assets and debts. In order to understand the importance of 
different factors in shaping wealth distributions we investigate cross-country differences in 
participation, levels and the distribution of different wealth components.  
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Several recent studies have sought use decomposition techniques to estimate the role of 
population characteristics to estimate cross-country differences in wealth and debt and 
attempt to understand the role of institutions in explaining residual cross-country differences 
(Sierminska and Doorley, 2013, Doorley and Sierminska, 2014, Christelis et al., 2013).  
Sierminska and Doorley (2013) compare wealth-participation rates across a number of 
European countries, the US and Canada and focus on a comparison between households 
under 50 years and 50 years or over. Doorley and Sierminska (2014) use the same set of 
countries and data sources to compare levels of assets and liabilities and focus on differences 
between younger and older age cohorts. Christelis et al. (2013) examine ownership and levels 
in stocks, private businesses, principal residence and associated mortgages. They cover a 
larger set of countries (12 European countries and the US) but their analysis is restricted to 
those aged 50 or over. Closest to the analysis presented in this paper is Bover (2010) who 
compares the US and Spain and looks at the impact of household structure on the distribution 
of wealth. Overall, she finds that household structure has no impact on differences in wealth 
inequality measured by the Gini coefficient between the two countries but this masks the fact 
that differences in the lower part of the distribution would be reduced if the countries shared 
common household-structure distributions but much greater in the upper part of the 
distribution; highlighting the need to consider the whole distribution. This paper is novel due 
to its focus on net wealth inequality and the contribution of differences in the distribution of 
wealth components on net worth inequality, coverage of the complete age range for a larger 
sample of countries that includes the UK and Sweden and a wider set of household 
characteristics. The analysis is focused on the period shortly before the financial crisis (1998-
2002) when household wealth portfolios were fairly stable: before the dramatic increase in 
house-price inflation, in some countries, and the subsequent very turbulent period associated 
with the crisis. The period covered by the analysis provides a useful benchmark comparison 
between countries and it could be some time before the protracted economic shock associated 
with the crisis allows us to make these types of comparisons between countries. 
 
No single data resource has complete coverage of household assets and liabilities that would 
allow international comparability: like previous studies we have to make use of an 
incomplete data set which strikes a balance between coverage, comparability and 
completeness. International studies in the determinants and distribution of household wealth 
is still in its infancy and this paper contributes to a growing body of research which is 
building an important knowledge base. 
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We find that countries exhibiting both relatively low and relatively high income inequality 
can be characterised by relatively high wealth inequality. The biggest share of cross-country 
differences is not due to differences in the distribution of household demographic and 
economic characteristics but rather reflect strong unexplained country effects. We discuss  
the factors that are likely to contribute to these differences. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 considers data and measurement issues; our 
method is outlined in section 3; in section 4 we present our findings in relation to cross-
country differences in the distribution of net worth; section 5 looks at individual wealth 
components; section 6 explores potential reasons for the unexplained country effects and 
section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data and measurement issues 
There is no single standardised concept of personal wealth that will be appropriate across all 
distributional comparisons. Consider, for example, the different requirements of (A) 
comparisons of wealth distributions over time for a single country and (B) comparisons at a 
point in time across different countries. In choosing a wealth concept for problem (A) one 
should clearly take into account the special institutional, social and economic circumstances 
of the country in question and, indeed, the conventions in the literature on wealth studies in 
that specific country. But for problem (B) one needs to focus on a wealth concept that has 
essentially the same meaning across the set of countries under consideration: some wealth 
components relating to household tenure, pensions and the like may be very different from 
one country to another; in some comparison may be different as between problems such as 
(A) and (B). 
 
For these reasons the datasets used are drawn from the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), a 
cross-national database which currently provides harmonised wealth data for 12 industrialised 
countries. From this database we have selected five countries - the UK, Italy, Finland, 
Sweden and the US – that provide revealing contrasts in terms of institutional frameworks 
and welfare state models. The original national datasets are the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS, 2000) for the UK, the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW, 
2002) for Italy, the Household Wealth Survey (1998) for Finland and the Wealth Survey 
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(HINK, 2002) for Sweden. For the US the LWS database includes data from two national 
surveys: the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF, 2001) and the Panel Study of Income 
Distribution (PSID, 2001). The latter is a general household survey with a special focus on 
income while the former is a specialised wealth survey. An important feature of the SCF is 
that it over-samples the wealthy and therefore has a better representation of the upper tail of 
the wealth distribution which is highly right-skewed.
1
 In this paper we use data from both the 
SCF and the PSID to test the sensitivity of our results to survey design features. Although 
there are substantial methodological differences across the national surveys, LWS has 
constructed comparable variables for a number of wealth measures and there is a growing 
body of research exploiting this rich data resource. However, some comparability issues 
remain. In section 6 we discuss some of these differences and their implications for 
understanding cross-country differences in wealth inequality.   
 
The main measure of wealth used is total household net worth constructed as the sum of 
household financial and non-financial assets minus total household debt. Financial assets 
include deposit accounts, stocks, bonds and mutual funds. Non-financial assets (“housing 
assets” hereafter) include own principal residence and investment real estate. Total debt 
refers to all outstanding loans, both home secured and non-home secured including informal 
debt – we break this total down into housing debt and all other debt (“financial debt” 
hereafter). A limitation of our study is that the measure of net worth that we use excludes 
business and pension assets, and trust funds since data on these assets are not available for all 
countries. Given the differential importance of these types of wealth in different countries, 
our comparison would – at least partly – reflect the omissions of these types of assets.2 
However, pension wealth and business equity are very different forms of private wealth 
holdings and are typically less liquid than financial and housing assets.   
 
In addition to total net worth, we analyse four wealth components: gross financial assets, 
gross housing assets, net financial assets, housing equity as well as housing and financial 
debt. All wealth values (as all monetary values in this paper) are transformed to constant 
                                                 
1
 The SCF covers around 4,500 families. A booster sample, chosen on the basis of information contained in tax 
returns, is selected to disproportionately sample wealthy families (but excluding the wealthiest 400 families, as 
defined by Forbes magazine).   
2
 Sierminska et al. (2006) provides a detailed discussion on this issue and a reconciliation between LWS and the 
national definitions of net worth. 
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2005 prices using the national CPI and are converted at 2005 PPP-adjusted Euros (Euro area 
16 countries) using the purchasing power parities for gross domestic product (GDP).   
 
The unit of analysis is the household, defined in most of the countries as a group of people 
who live in the same dwelling and share household expenses. For the UK (BHPS) there is no 
requirement that household members share household expenses. In Sweden although the 
household unit definition is close to the one adopted in the other surveys, for non-married 
individuals in the registry data who do not respond to the telephone interview (around 30 per 
cent) it was not possible to identify if they were cohabiting unless they had children in 
common. These individuals were classified as single person households and therefore the 
number of single person and single parent households is somewhat overestimated (Statistics 
Sweden, 2006).    
 
There are large cross-country differences in household net worth, with differences varying 
across the distribution; summary statistics are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix. The US 
has the highest average (mean) level of net wealth (€207,000 based on SCF; although 
€158,100 based on PSID), followed by Italy (€163,600), the UK (€116,700), Finland 
(€66,500) and Sweden (€50,900). At low wealth percentiles the lowest wealth levels are 
observed in Sweden, the US and Finland (in this order) while the highest are found in Italy 
and the UK. At higher points of the distribution, the highest wealth levels are observed in the 
US and Italy while the lowest are in Sweden and Finland. To illustrate how wealth varies 
across the whole distribution, Figure 1 plots the percentile distribution of net worth for each 
country.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
In terms of the Gini coefficient, Sweden and the US have the highest estimated levels of 
wealth inequality, at 0.89 and 0.83 (SCF) respectively, while Italy has the lowest (0.60); 
Finland (0.68) and the UK (0.63) are positioned in the middle – see Table 1. A similar picture 
emerges when percentile ratios are considered (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 1). Once again 
Sweden and the US exhibit the highest levels of wealth inequality and Italy the lowest. 
Finland has higher inequality than the UK in terms of measures that measure dispersion in the 
lower tail of distribution (the 25/50 percentile ratio) but lower for those measuring dispersion 
in the upper tail (the 90/50 percentile ratio). Cowell (2013) provides a detailed comparison of 
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wealth distributions in Canada, Sweden, the UK and the USA and shows that the high wealth 
inequality exhibited by Sweden is robust under alternative assumptions about the definition 
of wealth and about the precise shape of the upper tail of the distribution. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
As we want to understand the source of cross-country variation in the distribution of wealth 
and in particular in characterising the contribution of socio-economic factors in explaining 
differences in the distribution of wealth and observed levels of wealth inequality, we consider 
five separate factors: 1) age; 2) household structure; 3) educational attainment; 4) working 
status; and, 5) household income (net of capital income). Although differences in financial 
institutions could have an effect on personal decisions about household composition or 
educational attainment, we only consider first-order effects in this paper and therefore treat 
the socio-economic factors as exogenous. 
 
Age, education and working status are all defined in relation to the household reference 
person (see Cowell, Karagiannaki and McKnight, 2013 for details on how this is defined in 
each data source).
3
 The most notable differences are the substantially lower proportion of 
younger households in Italy; the lower proportion of older households and the higher 
proportion of lone-parent households in the US and the higher proportion of more educated 
households in the US and Sweden. As expected, differences in the level and the distribution 
of household disposable income are striking. The US is the country with the highest mean 
income levels but also the most dispersed income distribution, followed by the UK. By 
contrast Finland and Sweden have lower average income levels but also substantially lower 
income inequality. Mean income levels in Italy are similar to that of the two Nordic counties 
but levels of income inequality are similar to the UK.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
Following DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) (hereafter DFL) we use semi-parametric 
decomposition methods to estimate the portion of cross-country differences which is 
                                                 
3
 Cross-country differences in the distribution of these characteristics and in mean and median net worth values 
according to these characteristics are shown in Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix. 
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attributable to differences in the distribution of household characteristics.
4
 Let 𝑤  denote 
wealth and 𝑧 a vector of wealth determinants. The distribution of wealth for each country 
𝑖=1,...,5 is described by:  
𝐹(𝑤|𝑖) = ∫ 𝐹(𝑤, 𝑧|𝑖)𝑑𝑧 =  ∫ 𝐹(𝑤|𝑧, 𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑧(𝑧|𝑖)
𝑧
𝑧
                                                    (1) 
The counterfactual distribution of interest can be thought of as the distribution that mixes the 
distribution of characteristics of country 𝑖 with the wealth generating function from country 𝑗. 
Following DFL this can be written as: 
 
   ∫ 𝐹(𝑤|𝑧, 𝑗)𝑑𝐹(𝑧|𝑖)    =   ∫𝐹(𝑤|𝑧, 𝑗)ψ(z)𝑑𝐹(𝑧|𝑖)                                                         (2)
𝑧
     
𝑧
 
 
where ψ(z)=
𝑑𝐹(𝑧|𝑖)
𝑑𝐹(𝑧|𝑗)
 is a reweighting factor that can be estimated using standard methods such 
as probit or logit.  
 
The basic idea of the DFL approach is to start with one country (𝑖) and then replace the 
distribution of 𝑧 , 𝐹(𝑧|𝑖) , with the distribution of characteristics in 𝑗  (𝐹(𝑧|𝑗) ) using the 
reweighting factor ψ (·):  
 
                                        ψ(z)=
Pr(𝑧|𝑖)
Pr(z|𝑗)
=  
Pr(i|z)/Pr (j)
Pr(j|z)/Pr (i)
                                                             (3) 
  
This reweighting factor is computed by estimating a probability model for Pr(𝑧|𝑖) and using 
the predicted probabilities to compute a value ψ̂(𝑧) for each observation. Following DFL we 
use a flexible probit model to derive the reweighting function ψ(z) . In principle the 
reweighted function could also be derived using non-parametric specifications (Barsky et al., 
2002, Bover, 2010, Sierminska et al., 2010), but this is inappropriate here because of the 
large number of variables in 𝑧.   
 
                                                 
4
 As stressed by Bover (2010, p259) “An advantage of relying on conditional distributions is that one avoids 
having to choose a smoothing method. It is well known that density estimation is sensitive to the smoothing 
method adopted. This is particularly relevant in the case of wealth distributions, which often have a marked 
spike at zero because a non-negligible proportion of the population has no wealth. The presence of spikes 
increases the sensitivity of density estimations to the smoothing method used.” 
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In addition to considering the aggregate compositional effect in our decompositions we also 
consider the effect of each covariate separately. The distribution of wealth
5
 may be expressed 
as:  
 
    ∫ 𝐹(𝑤|𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑖) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑦|𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑖) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑝|𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑖) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑒|𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑖) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑑|𝑐, 𝑖)           
∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑐|𝑖)                                                                                                                                    (4) 
 
which captures six conditional expectations: the first is the conditional expected wealth 
function given the wealth determinants (𝑧); the second is the conditional expected income 
function (𝑦 ) given working status (𝑝 ), education (𝑒 ), household structure (𝑑 ) and age 
composition (𝑐); the third is the conditional labour force participation function; similarly the 
fourth and the fifth functions capture the conditional expected education and household 
structure functions respectively while the final terms capture the age composition.  
 
Following the methodology of Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006) we can use (4) to define a 
series of counterfactual wealth distributions. Suppose we want to compare countries 1 and 2.: 
to do this we can define the wealth distribution that would prevail if country 2 retained its 
own conditional wealth, working status, educational attainment, household structure and age 
composition but had the same conditional income functions as country 1,
6
 namely 
 
𝐹𝐴(𝑤) = ∫ 𝐹(𝑤|𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑗) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑦|𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑖)  ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑝|𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑗) ∙  𝑑𝐹(𝑒|𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑗)
∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑑|𝑐, 𝑗)                                                                                                                  (5) 
 
Comparing equation (5) with the actual distribution from country 2 we can isolate the effect 
of differences in conditional income distribution on cross-country differences in wealth. 
Similarly we can define the counterfactual wealth distribution 𝐹𝐵 that would result if country 
2 had the same income and working status distributions as country 1 but retained its own 
conditional wealth distribution and the distribution of the remaining characteristics. Similarly 
𝐹𝐶 , 𝐹𝐷 , and 𝐹𝐸  are the counterfactual wealth distribution if in addition to income and 
                                                 
5
 Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006). 
6
 Note that Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006) use the opposite operationalization to define the compositional 
effect i.e. they define the distribution that would prevail if group 2 (in their case) had retained their income 
function but had the same conditional wealth, income etc. function as the comparison group.  
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working status, country 𝑗 had the same education, household types and age distributions as 
country 𝑖 respectively. 
 
Based on these counterfactual distributions we can decompose differences in wealth across 
pairs of countries in the following way:  
 
𝐹𝑗 − 𝐹𝑖 = [𝐹𝑗(𝑤) − 𝐹𝐴(𝑤)] + [𝐹𝐴(𝑤) − 𝐹𝐵(𝑤)] + [𝐹𝐵(𝑤) − 𝐹𝐶(𝑤)] + [𝐹𝐶(𝑤) − 𝐹𝐷(𝑤)] +
    [𝐹𝐷(𝑤) − 𝐹𝐸(𝑤)] + [𝐹𝐸(𝑤) − 𝐹𝑖 (𝑤)]                                                                                (6) 
 
To estimate the counterfactual distributions described in equation (6) we use the DFL 
reweighting approach for each country in order for the distribution of characteristics to match 
that of our comparison country 𝑖. For example:  
   
 𝐹𝐴(𝑤) = ∫ ψ𝑦,𝑝,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐 𝐹(𝑤|𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑗) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑦|𝑝, 𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑗) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑝|𝑒, 𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑗) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑒|𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑗)
∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑑|𝑐, 𝑗) ∙ 𝑑𝐹(𝑐|𝑗)                                                                                                  (7) 
where  
                                                 𝜓𝑦,𝑝,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐,𝑖=
𝑃𝑟 (𝑖|𝑦,𝑝,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐,𝑖)∙𝑃(𝑗|𝑝,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐,𝑖)
𝑃𝑟 (𝑗|𝑦,𝑝,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐,𝑖)∙𝑃(𝑖|𝑝,𝑒,𝑑,𝑐,𝑖)
                                   (8) 
 
The difficulty with the decomposition is that the effect attributed to each factor would always 
depend on the sequence at which its effect is evaluated: Equation (6) is just one possibility. 
Using 5 components to decompose wealth differences leads to 120 relevant sequences. With 
no particular preference over the relevant sequence we follow Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand 
(2006) and calculate each in turn and present results of the simple average across all possible 
sequences.  
 
In all our decompositions we use the UK as our base country and compare it to each of the 
remaining four countries. Each of the counterfactual distributions is then constructed by 
reweighting the distributions of characteristics in each of the countries in order to mirror the 
distributions of characteristics in the UK. With a number of potential countries that could be 
selected as the reference country in the decomposition analysis it is simply a matter of 
choosing a meaningful counterfactual case as there is no right answer to the question of 
which reference group to select (Fortin et al., 2010). We choose the UK on the basis that it is 
generally regarded to hold a position between the US and continental European countries in 
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terms of inequality and institutional frameworks.
7
 The difference in the observed and the 
counterfactual distribution in each of the countries captures the contribution of characteristics 
to the observed differences firstly in net worth and then for each of its subcomponents 
separately, considering both differences in the extent of ownership of different types of 
assets, the degree of indebtedness as well as levels of wealth holdings. 
 
4. Analysing cross-country differences in the distribution of net worth 
As an initial step we estimated wealth production functions for each country. These showed 
standard relationships between wealth holdings and age (initially increasing with age before 
declining), household composition (households with sole adults are associated with lower 
average wealth holdings), educational attainment (positive relationship) and household 
income (higher income households holding relatively higher levels of wealth). However, we 
find the “returns” to these characteristics vary by country and this coupled with differences in 
the distribution of characteristics could lead to cross-country variation in wealth inequality. 
The results from these regressions can be found in Tables A6 (standard OLS model) and A7 
(Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation) of the Appendix. 
 
Cumulative wealth distributions  
Figure 2 shows the actual and counterfactual net worth distributions for each pairwise 
comparison and Table A8 of the Appendix shows the detail for five quantile points in the 
distributions (P10, P25, P50, P90 and P95). For each country the figures show the actual 
difference with the UK and the counterfactual difference (assuming distribution of 
characteristics is the same as the UK). For Finland, for example, at the 10
th
 percentile net 
worth is -€2,660, compared to -€290 in the UK meaning that net worth in Finland at P10 is 
€2,370 lower than in the UK. The counterfactual estimate shows that 92% of this differential 
can be explained by differences in household characteristics between households at this point 
in the distribution in the UK and Finland. At the 25
th
 percentile their contribution increases to 
more than 500% of the wealth difference (if Finnish households had the same characteristics 
as UK households at P25 the difference would be 500 times greater). Some strong effects are 
also estimated for the US where the effect of household characteristics operates towards 
                                                 
7
 We conduct some sensitivity analysis using US (SCF) as an alternative base country. There are some 
differences in the extent to which the distributions of characteristics account for cross-country variation in the 
distribution of wealth but the main conclusions are unchanged. Results are available in Tables A4 and A5 of 
the Appendix. 
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reducing net worth at lower wealth percentiles and towards increasing it at mid and higher 
wealth percentiles. On the other hand, the characteristics play a very small role in explaining 
differences in net worth holdings in Sweden relative to the UK, even at the lower end of the 
distribution where we might expect to find stronger effects. Similarly, household 
characteristics appear to play a very small role in explaining differences between UK and 
Italian households’ wealth holdings.  
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
Detailed decomposition analysis allows us to identify which characteristics are contributing 
to cross-country differences in wealth holdings at different points in the distribution of 
wealth. In each panel of Table 2, the first row shows the total differences in net worth with 
the UK, the second row shows the total compositional effect (i.e. the part of the difference 
which can be explained by differences in the distribution of characteristics) while rows 3-7 
divide the compositional effect into the contribution of the five main factors.   
 
In Finland the level and distribution of income contributes to increasing the difference with 
the UK (lower net wealth across the distribution). The distribution of education does not 
significantly contribute to differences in the distribution of wealth, and working status only 
plays a small role at the top of the distribution; widening the gap with the UK. The 
distribution of age and household structure play a small role, to varying degrees across the 
distribution, to widen the gap with the UK. 
 
In Italy, the distribution of age, educational attainment and household structure all contribute 
to the higher levels of net worth across the distribution relative to the UK while income 
works in the opposite direction. 
 
In the US (SCF), the distribution of income, educational attainment and household structure 
all contribute to higher net wealth holdings at the top of the distribution (P90) relative to the 
UK, while the distribution of age works in the opposite direction. Wealth holdings at P10, 
P25 and P50 are lower in the US than in the UK. The distribution of age in the US augments 
to this difference, while the distribution of educational attainment and income reduces the 
difference. The distribution of working status is not a significant factor in explaining any of 
the difference between the US and the UK. 
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In Sweden the level and distribution of income, particularly at the top of the wealth 
distribution, age and household structure increase the difference with the UK and contributes 
to observed lower wealth holdings in Sweden. On the other hand, the distribution of working 
status and educational attainment work in the opposite direction, reducing the difference with 
the UK.   
 
However, despite some important individual effects, household characteristics account for 
only part of the cross-country variation in household wealth and its distribution. The largest 
share of the differences remain largely unexplained: country-specific effects appear to be the 
main determinant of cross-country variation in wealth distributions.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Wealth inequality  
To estimate the role of household characteristics in accounting for cross-country differences 
in wealth inequality, we use these counterfactual distributions to compute measures of 
inequality. For each country we report actual wealth inequality and the counterfactual 
estimate that would prevail if each country had the same distribution of household 
characteristics as the UK (Table 3). The distribution of characteristics explains a large share 
of the higher net worth inequality in Finland (relative to the UK); inequality in Finland would 
be lower with the same distribution of characteristics as the UK for all measures apart from 
P25/P50 and top 1% share. For Italy, the distribution of characteristics appears to have an 
equalizing effect for all net-worth inequality measures. Net wealth inequality would be higher 
with the same distribution of characteristics as the UK, although inequality would remain 
below the UK, Italy along with Finland remain the lowest net-wealth inequality countries in 
this group. So, for the counterfactual net worth distribution, Italy ranks first or second as the 
least unequal country for all inequality measures; the UK is positioned between US/Sweden 
and Italy.  
 
The distribution of characteristics in the US explain some of the higher net wealth inequality 
relative to the UK but, for all measures of inequality with the exception of the Gini 
coefficient, inequality remains the highest in the US out of these five countries. Similarly for 
Sweden the distribution of characteristics explains some of the higher net wealth inequality 
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with the exception of the top 1% share measure. With the exception of the Gini coefficient 
net wealth inequality is lower in Sweden than in the US (SCF and PSID) but higher than in 
Italy, Finland and the UK (except for dispersion in the lower half of the distribution measured 
by P25/P50. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
5. Analysis by wealth component 
Levels analysis  
A further understanding of the factors that shape cross-country differences in the distribution 
of household net worth can be gained from the analysis of cross country differences in the 
composition and size of different types of asset holdings. We focus on two main components: 
net financial wealth and net non-financial wealth (i.e. principal home equity plus the net 
value of investment real estate) as well as their main subcomponents - financial assets, 
housing assets, financial debt and housing debt. For Sweden, we are unable to separately 
identify net financial and net housing wealth as it is not possible to separately identify 
housing debt and financial debt. We apply the counterfactual analysis to the role of household 
characteristics and country specific factors in explaining the variation in the distribution of 
different wealth components. 
 
The actual shares of asset and debt ownership by type shows some interesting differences 
between the countries (Table 4). Home ownership is most prevalent in Italy (72%) and least 
prevalent in Sweden (58%). US households are most likely to hold some form of debt (SCF 
76%), followed closely by Swedish households (71%) while only a minority of Italian 
households (20%) hold any debt. The counterfactual debt ownership shares are lower than 
actual shares for the US. This means that if US households had characteristics comparable 
with UK households then debt ownership rates would be reduced. Detailed decomposition 
analysis for debt levels (details not shown) reveals that differences in age and education 
drive the greater holding of financial debt in the US relative to the UK and differences in the 
distribution of income and education characteristics drive the higher relative holding of 
housing debt. The decomposition analysis in Table 4 shows that, although the size and the 
direction of the contribution of characteristics differ across countries and across different 
debt types, a large share of cross-country differences remains unexplained.  
15 
 
 
The contribution of characteristics in explaining differences in asset ownership is rather 
small. The two main exceptions are Finland and Sweden where the distribution of 
characteristics is associated with lower rates of homeownership. The counterfactual 
homeownership rates show that Finland would have the highest homeownership rate and 
Sweden would still have the lowest homeownership rates. In terms of the effects household 
characteristics have on housing and financial debt, the counterfactual US rates (PSID) are 
lower than in the UK (in contrast to the actual housing-related debt rankings).   
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
The first panel of Table 5 shows results for net financial wealth and its two components 
(gross financial wealth and financial debt). Financial wealth in Finland is higher in the 
counterfactual than in the actual distribution at all points of the distribution, and especially at 
the middle and lower tail of the distribution where lower net wealth holdings can be 
explained by household characteristics: if Finnish households had the characteristics of UK 
households, net financial wealth at P25 and P50 would actually be higher than that observed 
in the UK. However, household characteristics in Finland only explain a small amount of the 
lower net financial wealth holdings at P90. The distribution of characteristics makes a small 
contribution to explaining the distribution of net financial assets in Italy relative to the UK. 
Although the distribution of characteristics in the US (SCF) plays no role in explaining the 
lower wealth levels at the bottom of the distribution (in fact they would be even lower if US 
households had same distribution of characteristics as the UK), they do explain, to some 
extent, the higher wealth holdings in the upper tail of the distribution.
89
 In all countries the 
contribution of characteristics is stronger for financial assets than for financial debt, 
suggesting the operation of stronger unobserved country effects in the distribution of 
financial debt; most likely due to institutional settings and cultural differences. Although 
household characteristics explain some of the observed variation in financial wealth across 
these five countries, it is predominantly unexplained country effects that drive cross-country 
differences, particularly for the distribution of debt.   
                                                 
8
 Despite differences in the magnitude of the effects, household characteristics in the PSID also explain some of 
the higher wealth holdings in the upper tail but also some of the lower wealth holding in the lower tail. 
9
 Detailed decomposition results for net and gross financial assets detailing the contribution of household 
characteristics reveals that higher shares of households with high income and high educational attainment at 
the top of the distributions in the US contribute to the higher values of net and gross financial assets. 
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The second panel of Table 5 shows results for housing equity and its components. In 
Finland, although differences in the distribution of characteristics explain a sizeable 
proportion of the lower housing equity levels, these effects are largely driven by the effect of 
characteristics on homeownership probability (see Table 4). Again the distribution of 
characteristics makes almost no contribution to explaining the differences in housing wealth 
and mortgage debt holdings in Italy relative to the UK. The distribution of characteristics 
explains a large share of the substantially higher mortgage debt in the US at P90.
10
 Housing 
equity in the US falls significantly at P50 and P90 when we reweight household 
characteristics to match the UK.
11
 Characteristics of US households actually lead to a 
narrowing of the difference between the US and the UK for net housing wealth. The 
counterfactual distribution estimates show that if US households had similar characteristics 
to UK households, net housing wealth would be even lower than it actually is (P50 and P90). 
Detailed decomposition analysis (detail not shown) reveals that differences in the 
distribution of income and education contribute to this difference. In Sweden, although the 
distribution of characteristics explains a considerable share of the lower gross housing 
wealth holdings (principally through homeownership) housing wealth in Sweden is still 
substantially lower than in any of the other countries studied.  
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
 
Inequality  
Examination of the detailed decomposition results suggests that the contribution of 
characteristics in explaining cross-country differences in wealth inequality within the 
components of net worth is small (Table 6).
12
 Imposing a common distribution of 
characteristics does not result in any change in the inequality rankings for net financial or net 
housing wealth; except Finland swaps places with Italy and becomes the least unequal in net 
housing wealth (Gini coefficient and top 10% share and top 1% net financial wealth). For net 
financial wealth the most sizeable effects are found for Finland, where the Gini coefficient is 
                                                 
10
 PSID counterfactual values are lower than for the UK suggesting that the better coverage of wealthier 
households in the SCF includes households with more housing debt as well as wealth. 
11
 US households appear to invest less in housing wealth than either UK or Italian households at all points of the 
distribution and less than Finnish households up to about the 75
th
 percentile. 
12
 Additional tables reporting the results for the decomposition results conditional on households being owners 
of the different types of holdings are available in Tables A9 and A10 of the Appendix.  
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reduced by 25 points and the top 1% and 10% wealth shares by 65 and 77% respectively 
when the distribution of characteristics is reweighted to resemble the UK. According to the 
SCF, the distribution of characteristics in the US has an equalising effect in terms of the Gini 
coefficient for net financial wealth and the top 10% share but a disequalizing effect in terms 
of the top 1%.
13
 Comparisons of the two housing equity components show that although the 
effects in Finland and Italy are exclusively related to gross housing assets, in the US sizeable 
effects are estimated for both housing assets and debts. The effects of characteristics have a 
rather small effect in accounting for the higher degree of inequality observed in Sweden.   
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
6. The unexplained country effects 
Differences in the distributions of demographic and economic characteristics of households 
partially explain cross-country variation in wealth distributions but we have shown that a 
significant share remains unexplained by the household characteristics controlled for in the 
decomposition analysis. Some related empirical studies also identifying residual country 
effects have sought to identify country level characteristics that can account for this 
‘unexplained’ variation. Christelis et al., (2013) conduct a decomposition analysis examining 
cross country variation in wealth participation rates and levels for those aged 50 or over 
between the US and a number of European countries. They regress the unexplained 
component (coefficient effects) on a number of macro-level economic variables covering 
factors likely to affect stock ownership (eg market capitalization to GDP ratio), 
entrepreneurial activity and home ownership (eg house price index). They find that 
differences in economic environments captured by these variables explain much of the 
residual variation in wealth ownership and levels.  Sierminska and Doorley (2013) examine 
differences in wealth ownership rates across a number of European countries, US and 
Canada. They find that differences in household composition and income explain part of the 
differences between countries. They regress the unexplained wealth gaps on a set of country-
level institutional indicators (such as financial development index, mortgage maturity, 
economic freedom). They find that wealth ownership is more sensitive to institutional 
settings among younger households (under 50) than older households and that different 
institutional settings are related to portfolios decisions. These macro level economic factors 
                                                 
13
 Results from PSID suggest the opposite for the top 1% and the Gini coefficient is unchanged which is likely 
to be due to differences in the distribution of characteristics within the survey samples.   
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and institutional differences between countries will also account for some of the variation in 
the unexplained differences between countries highlighted in this study. We now examine in 
more detail the extent to which this unexplained component may be affected by three things: 
measurement issues, the role of wealth transfers, the role of education loans.  
 
Measurement issues  
Despite the harmonisation of key variables in LWS there remain some issues affecting data 
comparability that could contribute to the unexplained gaps between countries.
14
 A feature of 
the Swedish household survey is that it does not record deposit accounts unless interest 
payments from these assets exceed 100 SEK (approximately 10 € in 2002). Given that the 
interest rate was approximately 3.75% in 2002 this implies that accounts with less than 270 € 
were excluded.
15
 This will lead to an underestimate of cash savings at the lower end of the 
distribution. To determine the importance of this restriction we apply a similar bottom coding 
in the deposit accounts in other countries. Although a small impact at the lower end of the 
distribution was found in all countries, its impact on overall net worth inequality is trivial. In 
the UK for example wealth inequality in terms of the Gini coefficient remains unchanged by 
the application of bottom coding.   
 
Another feature of the Swedish wealth survey is that business debt cannot be disentangled 
from other components of debt. Net worth in Sweden includes business debt held by 
households, but for all other countries, the measure of net worth we use (NW1; LWS 
variable) does not include business debt as part of households’ liabilities. Since business debt 
in NW1 is not offset by household held business assets, its inclusion in the Swedish wealth 
data will affect measured net worth inequality. The importance of this can be assessed by 
comparing differences in net worth inequality estimates based on NW1 and NW2. The latter 
is the LWS measure of net worth which includes business assets and liabilities. NW2 is 
available only for a subset of countries (Italy, US and Sweden). Estimates of net worth 
inequality based on these two measures are reported in the first four columns of Table 7. This 
shows that in all countries except Sweden the inequality of net worth excluding business 
equity (NW1) is lower than for net worth which includes it (NW2), implying that business 
equity has a disequalizing effect on net worth inequality. In Sweden inequality in net worth 
                                                 
14
 A more complete discussion of the differences can be found in Cowell et al. (2012).  
15
 Approximately 15-20 per cent of total deposits have been excluded (see LWS survey information for Sweden 
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/lws-database/by-country/swedenwealth/ last accessed 16/02/2016) 
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including business equity is lower than the measure of net worth which excludes it. This 
reflects the fact that the former measure (NW1) includes business debt but not business assets 
for Swedish households and NW1 wealth inequality in Sweden is over-inflated as a result.   
 
The LWS has sought to harmonise wealth definitions and we apply household weights to 
adjust for non-random sampling and participant proportions, however the sampling frames 
vary between the datasets used in our study and may lead to differences in the estimated 
wealth distributions and inequality measures. In particular the fact that the SCF has better 
coverage of the top end of the wealth distribution and that the Swedish data is based on 
administrative records of wealth may lead one to suspect that estimates of inequality 
measured by the Gini will be higher where coverage of the top end is more complete 
(Alvaredo, 2011). It is reassuring to note that while the PSID (with similar population 
coverage as the survey data for the UK and Italy) produces lower wealth inequality estimates 
for the US than estimates from the SCF, these are still higher than all other countries in our 
sample other than Sweden. Even though survey data for Sweden provides lower estimates of 
wealth inequality relative to registry based data (Bager-Sjögren and Klevmarken, 1998), it is 
also the case that survey data for Sweden finds high levels of inequality relative to other 
European countries (Skopek et al., 2011). This suggests that the portrayal of the US and 
Sweden as high wealth inequality countries is accurate. 
 
A further issue which raises concerns about cross-country comparability relates to differences 
in the definition of household unit adopted in each survey. In most surveys a household is 
defined as a group of individuals who live together and share expenses; but the UK does not 
adopt the share of expenses restriction in its definition of household unit. This means that 
tenants renting a room in a shared house will be included as a member of the main household 
unit. Typically these tenants will have very few assets, if any, and therefore estimates of 
wealth inequality are likely to be lower where they are not identified as separate household 
units. In Sweden although the household unit definition is very close to the one adopted in the 
other surveys, for individuals in the registry data who did not respond to the telephone 
interview (around 30 per cent), it was not possible to identify cohabiting adults without 
common children. In this case cohabiting adults are counted as two separate households and 
only the sample person was included in the survey. This means that in the Swedish survey the 
number of single person and single parent households is somewhat overestimated (Statistics 
Sweden, 2006). In our counterfactual analysis we reweight household type distributions to 
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match the UK household type distribution which means we can account for the part of the 
bias related to family type distribution but not any bias that this causes to the wealth estimates 
themselves.    
 
An important measurement issue is that the measure of household wealth is not 
comprehensive – it doesn’t capture pension or business wealth. The extent to which the size 
of missing components vary between countries and differ in terms of their distribution could 
contribute to the unexplained differences between countries. As noted earlier, the role the 
welfare state plays in terms of pension provision, subsidising the costs of tertiary education 
and providing other in-kind benefits will affect individuals’ motives and need to save and 
accumulate assets. One would expect that the effect of social security in crowding-out private 
savings would be stronger in the lower part of the distribution (as shown by Hubbard et al., 
1995 low wealth accumulation can be explained as a utility maximising response to asset-
based, means-tested welfare programmes and discussed in Davies et al., 2011) which in turn 
may explain the high degree of wealth inequality in countries with more generous welfare 
systems and therefore cross-country differences in the wealth distribution in the lower part of 
the distribution. Therefore, the unexplained cross-country differences in the distribution of 
household wealth may reflect both the direct effect of the exclusion of social security wealth 
and its indirect effect through its effect on saving propensities.   
  
Earlier in this section we examined the importance of the exclusion of business equity, 
highlighting that despite the disequalizing effect of business equity its exclusion from the 
wealth measure used in this paper does not account for a significant part of the unexplained 
country effects. We conducted some additional analysis to test the importance of restricting 
our measure of household wealth to financial and housing wealth by using the non-
harmonised measure of household wealth supplied in LWS for the US (SCF). This measure 
includes all wealth components that are available in SCF, including private pension wealth, 
life insurance, durables and collectibles, informal loans etc. (Sierminska et al., 2006). The 
results from this analysis shows that, not surprisingly, wealth levels are higher across the 
distribution with the more comprehensive measure of wealth, inequality is reduced by a 
relatively small amount (approximately 4 Gini points) with the exception of the P25/P50 
measure which is higher for the more comprehensive measure. Despite the reduced level, 
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wealth inequality in the US remains higher than in the UK, Finland and Italy.
16
 The 
implication is that our main findings would not be affected by this restriction unless their 
distribution across households diverge significantly from that observed in the US. 
 
The role of educational loans  
Educational loans are unlike many other forms of debt which are often offset by the value of 
the asset they were used to fund; educational loans are offset by a future income stream.
 17
 
Our analysis of LWS shows that there is considerable cross-country variation both in the size 
of educational loans and their take-up rates. Cowell et al. (2012) discusses in detail the 
institutional framework related to educational loans for the five countries. Here we mention 
the main cross-country differences and we discuss their implications on measured wealth 
inequality.  
 
For Finland and Sweden the respective loan take-up estimates among eligible students stand 
at around 35 per cent and 65 per cent respectively while for the US results from the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth suggest that among young adults ever enrolled in college 46 per 
cent have educational loans (Dwyer et al., 2012). Analysis of LWS suggest that educational 
loans represent about 11 per cent of overall financial debt holdings in Sweden and around 3 
and 5 per cent in Finland and the US respectively. Although educational loan data in LWS 
are not available for either Italy or the UK, in both countries the role of educational loans in 
supporting higher education at the time of the surveys was rather limited (this has changed 
rapidly in the UK during the last 10 years). The results in Table 7 suggest that the exclusion 
of educational loans from net worth (NW1) has an important effect on net worth inequality in 
Sweden - where the Gini coefficient falls from 0.89 to 0.83 - but its effect is very small in 
Finland (Gini falls from 0.68 to 0.67) and in the US (Gini falls from 0.83 to 0.82). The Gini 
coefficients of the counterfactual net worth distribution which exclude educational loans are 
significantly lower and educational loans explain all of the higher inequality in Sweden 
relative to the US. When we use the estimate of net worth which includes business equity and 
debt explicitly (NW2), actual and counterfactual inequality is higher in the US than in 
Sweden when educational loans are excluded.  
 
                                                 
16
 These results are available in Tables A11 and A12 of the Appendix. 
17
 This is not always the case as the value of consumer durables, vehicles, collectibles and valuables are often 
not included in measures of wealth. 
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The role of wealth transfers 
Cross-country differences in the magnitude and distribution of inheritances, and in the 
strength of the bequest motives may contribute to the unexplained cross country differences 
in the distribution of household wealth. Examining the importance of bequest motives in 
shaping the distribution of household wealth DiNardi (2004) found that the bequest motive 
can explain the high levels of wealth holdings and wealth inequality at the upper tail of the 
distribution in the US. Davies (1989) reached similar conclusions. To the extent that the 
bequest motive varies across the countries under consideration (and this will depend on the 
interaction of the nature of bequest motives and the extent of welfare state provisions) may 
explain part of the differences in the degree of wealth concentration at the upper tail of the 
distribution.  
The magnitude and the distribution of inheritances and inter vivos transfers received may be 
another factor contributing to the unexplained cross-country differences in the distribution of 
household wealth. Although there is no cross-national study looking at how inherited wealth 
shapes the distribution of household wealth in different countries, comparisons of results 
from several country studies shows that despite some significant differences in the absolute 
level of wealth transfers, their contribution in the distribution of household wealth is similar 
across the four countries under consideration. Klevmarken (2000) gives estimates ranging 
from 10 to19 per cent of accumulated wealth stemming from inheritance in Sweden, Wolff 
and Gittleman (2014) a range from 19 to 35 per cent in the US. Estimates for the UK suggests 
figures of around 16-28 per cent (Karagiannaki and Hills, 2013). Despite these differences in 
the magnitude of inheritances, all studies find that while the absolute amounts of inheritances 
are larger for higher wealth households in proportionate terms they are higher for low wealth 
households (Klevmarken 2000, Wolff and Gittleman, 2011, Karagiannaki and Hills, 2013, 
Karagiannaki, 2015). Overall, one could expect that despite some country differences in the 
levels of wealth stemming from inheritances, inheritance is not a major factor behind 
differences in the shape of the distribution of household wealth.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Obviously income plays a key role in wealth accumulation: but higher income inequality is 
not systematically related to higher wealth inequality. Although unequal income is related to 
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unequal ability to save and accumulate assets, other factors prove to be more important in 
shaping the distribution of wealth.   
 
The differences between countries’ wealth distributions cannot be explained away by 
differences in age, working status, household structure, education and current income. Taking 
these factors into account, some wealth inequality comparisons turn out as one might have 
expected: the US is unambiguously more unequal than the UK which is more unequal than 
Italy. By contrast the position of Finland in the ranking – between the UK and Italy – may 
come as a surprise. But perhaps the very high level of wealth inequality in Sweden (highest in 
terms of the Gini coefficient, second in terms of top 1%, top 5%, top 10% and P90/P50) 
seems most at odds with what one might predict given income inequality levels.   
 
The high level of wealth inequality in Sweden may be partly affected by variable definitions 
but even when these factors are taken into account Sweden remains a country with relative 
wealth inequality at least on a par with the US. However, in interpreting the high relative 
level of wealth inequality it should be noted that average gross wealth is lowest in Sweden as 
are wealth levels at P50 and P25; P90 is second lowest after Finland. Also the absolute gap in 
wealth holding between P25 and P90 is much lower in Sweden than in the US. There are 
good reasons why wealth holdings are relatively low among Swedish households and wealth 
is unequally distributed in a relative sense even though absolute gaps are smaller. Home 
ownership is lower in Sweden and the need to hold assets in Sweden is greatly reduced by 
state provision of health, education, pensions and income replacement during periods of 
hardship. For many years the Swedish population has saved in the form of higher taxation 
and therefore private wealth holdings are likely to be less representative of Swedish 
households’ standard of living than, say, for US households. Since the 1990s changes to the 
Swedish welfare state have meant that Swedish households are increasingly expected to make 
their own provisions and this may mean that inequalities in private household wealth 
holdings will become increasingly important. 
 
Housing is the largest physical asset that most households will ever hold. Homeownership 
rates are similar across four of the five countries at around 70%, but Sweden stands out as 
having relatively low rates (57%). Housing supply in Sweden is relatively constrained in 
large urban areas where there is high demand and the Swedish housing system is quite 
complex and idiosyncratic. Around one-third of owner-occupied homes (effectively all 
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owner-occupied apartments) are in what is known as the tenant-owned co-operative sector 
which appears to create a number of market distortions (European Housing Review, 2011). 
The recently abolished wealth tax and a higher average property tax rate (Hilbers et al., 2008) 
may have created some historical disincentives to acquire and accumulate housing assets.   
 
Italy also stands out with much lower levels of housing debt, relative to gross housing assets, 
likely to be explained partly by cultural differences (later age of household formation, greater 
parental assistance with house purchase, multi-generational households, attitudes to debt) and 
institutional differences (credit and mortgage markets). This contributes to relatively high 
levels of net worth among Italian households particularly in the lower and middle parts of the 
net worth distributions. 
 
Debt holdings lie at the heart of much of the wealth inequality differences across countries. 
Italy has lower financial debt as well as housing debt. US households are the most likely to 
hold financial and housing debt and the average value of these debts is greater. In addition, 
debt-holding among US households is comparatively more common in later life (Cowell et 
al., 2012, Christelis et al., 2013). Cross-country differences in educational loans, both in their 
incidence and their average value, explain all of the difference in wealth inequality between 
the US and Sweden. The contribution of characteristics in explaining cross-country 
differences is stronger for financial assets than for financial debt, suggesting the operation of 
stronger unexplained country effects in the distribution of financial debt.  
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Table 1 
Gini, GE(2) and percentile ratios for household total net worth by country 
 Gini GE(2)   P90/P50  P25/P50 
     
UK 0.66 1.18 4.86 0.04 
Finland 0.68 1.61 3.90 0.02 
Italy 0.60 1.16 3.55 0.15 
US SCF  0.83 15.23 9.88 0.01 
US PSID  0.80 10.07 9.00 0.00 
Sweden  0.89 5.30 9.51 na 
Note: Net worth (NW1) equal to the sum of net financial assets (TFA1) and housing equity (TNF1). Net financial assets 
equal to total financial assets (TFA1) minus financial debt - non-housing debt (NHD) in LWS wording. Housing equity 
equals to the sum of own principal residence, investment real estate (TNF1) minus mortgage debt.  All monetary values are 
expressed in 2005 Euros (Euro 16 ppp). 
Source: Own calculations based on LWS database.  
 
 
  
29 
 
Table 2: Detailed decompositions: Differences in selected percentiles of net worth distribution (figures in thousand 
2005 Euros) 
 P10 P25 P50 P90 
UK-Finland βs  % βs  % βs  % βs  % 
Unadjusted difference  -2.4 
*** 
 -1.5 
*
  -21.3 
***
  -143.0 
***
  
Compositional effect  -2.2 
*** 
 -9.2 
**
  -18.9 
***
  -50.5 
***
  
Income   -1.1 
*** 
50 -4.4 
**
 48 -10.9 
***
 58 -34.0 
***
 67 
Working status  0.2 
  
-9 -0.1 
 
 1 -0.2 
 
 1 -7.9 
**
 16 
Education  -0.2 
* 
9 -0.3 
 
 3 -0.2 
 
 1 -0.1 
 
 0 
Household structure  0.0 
  
0 -1.8 
*
 20 -3.9 
**
 21 -6.6 
*
 13 
Age  -1.0 
*** 
45 -2.5 
**
 27 -3.7 
***
 20 -1.9 
 
 4 
 
UK-Italy 
 
 
          
Unadjusted difference  0.3 
  
 13.7 
***
  41.7 
***
  66.5 
***
  
Compositional effect  -0.3 
  
 3.2 
 
  5.0 
 
  -6.9 
 
  
Income   -1.0 
*** 
333 -7.7 
***
 -241 -15.3 
***
 -306 -54.2 
***
 786 
Working status  0.0 
  
0 0.8 
*
 25 0.4 
 
 8 -5.9 
 
 86 
Education  0.1 
  
-33 1.3 
 
 41 6.0 
***
 120 16.1 
**
 -233 
Household structure  0.3 
** 
-100 4.1 
***
 128 7.5 
***
 150 19.8 
***
 -287 
Age  0.3 
* 
-100 4.6 
***
 144 6.3 
***
 126 17.4 
***
 -252 
 
UK-US SCF  
 
 
          
Unadjusted difference  -6.0 
*** 
 -2.0 
**
  -19.9 
***
  115.8 
***
  
Compositional effect  -0.1 
  
 0.2 
 
  10.4 
***
  105.7 
***
  
Income   1.0 
*** 
-1000 0.2 
*
 100 8.5 
***
 82 54.7 
***
 52 
Working status  -0.2 
  
200 0.1 
 
 50 0.0 
 
 0 -9.9 
 
 -9 
Education  0.6 
* 
-600 0.2 
**
 100 8.4 
***
 81 67.6 
***
 64 
Household structure  0.1 
  
-100 0.1 
 
 50 3.1 
*
 30 30.5 
***
 29 
Age  -1.6 
*** 
1600 -0.4 
*
 -200 -9.5 
***
 -91 -37.1 
***
 -35 
 
UK-US PSID  
 
 
          
Unadjusted difference  -3.6 
*** 
 -2.0 
**
  -21.4 
***
  65.5 
***
  
Compositional effect  -0.5 
  
 0.2 
 
  12.7 
***
  65.4 
**
  
Income   1.3 
*** 
-260 0.4 
***
 200 19.2 
***
 151 59.0 
***
 90 
Working status  -0.2 
  
40 0.0 
 
 0 -0.1 
 
 -1 -3.7 
 
 -6 
Education  -0.3 
  
60 0.1 
*
 50 4.7 
***
 37 44.2 
***
 68 
Household structure  0.0 
  
0 0.0 
 
 0 -0.9 
 
 -7 2.3 
 
 4 
Age  -1.3 
*** 
260 -0.3 
***
 -150 -10.2 
***
 -80 -36.4 
***
 -56 
 
UK-Sweden  
 
 
          
Unadjusted difference  -12.8 
*** 
 -2.9 
***
  -46.3 
***
  -151.2 
***
  
Compositional effect  -0.4 
  
 -0.6 
**
  -8.4 
***
  -24.2 
***
  
Income   -0.7 
** 
175 -0.5 
***
 83 -5.7 
***
 68 -22.1 
***
 91 
Working status  0.7 
** 
-175 0.5 
***
 -83 2.0 
***
 -24 1.3 
**
 -5 
Education  -0.6 
** 
150 0.1 
 
 -17 3.2 
***
 -38 13.6 
***
 -56 
Household structure  0.8 
** 
-200 -0.2 
*
 33 -5.0 
***
 60 -13.1 
***
 54 
Age  -0.6 
** 
150 -0.5 
***
 83 -2.9 
***
 35 -3.9 
***
 16 
Note: Counterfactual distributional statistics (βs) are estimated using the DFL decomposition re-weighting procedure. The 
explanatory variables included in the reweighting function include age, education and working status of the household head, 
household structure, and household income net of capital gains and interest payments. All counterfactual distributions are  
estimated using the UK as a base country i.e. they represent the distribution that would prevail in each of the countries if the 
distribution of characteristics was similar to the UK. The sample is restricted to households with non-missing data on wealth 
and key variables that are required to estimate the weighting function. Standard errors (se) based on 50 replications. 
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Table 3: DFL decomposition of net worth inequality  
 P90/50 P25/50 Gini Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% 
UK       
 Actual 4.86 0.04 0.66 45.36 29.83 9.98 
Finland       
Actual 3.90 0.02 0.68 45.34 31.19 13.03 
Counterfactual  3.51 0.17 0.62 41.20 28.05 11.28 
Italy        
Actual 3.55 0.15 0.60 42.07 28.64 10.76 
Counterfactual  3.80 0.13 0.62 43.88 29.70 11.58 
US SCF        
Actual 9.88 0.01 0.83 70.30 57.31 32.68 
Counterfactual  9.78 0.00 0.81 64.40 49.75 27.26 
US PSID        
Actual 9.00 0.00 0.80 63.47 48.61 25.24 
Counterfactual  10.72 0.00 0.81 64.27 49.42 25.94 
Sweden       
Actual 9.51 -0.04 0.89 58.10 40.53 17.52 
Counterfactual  7.22 0.00 0.85 56.04 40.10 17.77 
       
Note: See Table 2 (notes).    
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Table 4: DFL decomposition of difference in in asset and debt ownership and the extent of different types of 
indebtedness 
 Financial 
assets  
Housing 
assets 
 Financial 
debt 
Housing 
debt 
Debt  NW1<0 NFA<0 THSE<0 
UK           
 Actual 0.803 0.699  0.462 0.395 0.595  0.117 0.252 0.003 
Finland           
Actual 0.923 0.683  0.383 0.283 0.521  0.150 0.268 0.018 
Counterfactual  0.931 0.768  0.339 0.295 0.497  0.105 0.221 0.013 
Italy            
Actual 0.812 0.722  0.120 0.102 0.199  0.027 0.054 0.007 
Counterfactual  0.826 0.693  0.118 0.103 0.199  0.024 0.042 0.006 
US SCF            
Actual 0.915 0.694  0.651 0.465 0.758  0.192 0.378 0.009 
Counterfactual  0.907 0.674  0.634 0.379 0.708  0.195 0.401 0.009 
US PSID            
Actual 0.834 0.660  0.501 0.437 0.678  0.154 0.287 0.006 
Counterfactual  0.775 0.622  0.442 0.311 0.574  0.160 0.276 0.007 
Sweden           
Actual 0.789 0.575  n.a. n.a. 0.706  0.274 n.a. n.a. 
Counterfactual  0.794 0.621  n.a. n.a. 0.716  0.256 n.a. n.a. 
Note: See Table 2 (notes).    
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Table 5: DFL decompositions of cross country differences in the distribution of different wealth components - 
percentiles (thousand 2005 Euros) 
 Net financial wealth  Gross financial wealth  Financial debt 
UK P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90 
 Actual -0.04 1.88 63.56  0.07 4.16 66.45  0.00 0.00 11.56 
Finland            
Actual -0.48 1.29 27.02  0.32 2.67 28.58  0.00 0.00 9.69 
Counterfactual  0.00 2.66 38.50  0.65 4.36 40.94  0.00 0.00 9.69 
Italy             
Actual 0.74 6.36 51.45  1.59 7.11 51.98  0.00 0.00 1.59 
Counterfactual  1.17 7.10 52.12  1.82 7.43 53.04  0.00 0.00 1.33 
US SCF             
Actual -4.30 0.97 150.67  0.94 5.80 155.95  0.00 1.80 25.28 
Counterfactual  -5.11 0.34 99.34  0.55 3.51 102.08  0.00 1.17 23.18 
US PSID             
Actual -0.97 1.46 121.74  0.39 3.90 126.61  0.00 0.06 14.61 
Counterfactual  -0.49 0.39 97.39  0.04 1.95 100.31  0.00 0.00 11.69 
Sweden            
Actual - - -  0.14 4.69 53.12  - - - 
Counterfactual  - - -  0.23 6.39 68.18  - - - 
 Net housing wealth  Gross housing wealth  Housing debt 
UK P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90 
 Actual 0.00 54.89 245.57  0.00 86.67 288.90  0.00 0.00 86.67 
Finland            
Actual 0.00 37.13 137.22  0.00 48.43 151.75  0.00 0.00 32.29 
Counterfactual  6.46 51.82 177.58  16.14 64.57 193.72  0.00 0.00 37.13 
Italy             
Actual 0.00 92.82 318.24  0.00 95.47 318.24  0.00 0.00 1.38 
Counterfactual  0.00 84.86 318.24  0.00 90.17 319.30  0.00 0.00 2.12 
US SCF             
Actual 0.00 35.06 255.75  0.00 77.91 340.87  0.00 0.00 126.61 
Counterfactual  0.00 29.22 194.79  0.00 66.81 251.27  0.00 0.00 93.50 
US PSID             
Actual 0.00 33.11 228.87  0.00 77.91 303.86  0.00 0.00 124.66 
Counterfactual  0.00 23.37 194.79  0.00 53.57 243.48  0.00 0.00 77.91 
Sweden            
Actual - - -  0.00 19.39 149.43  - - - 
Counterfactual  - - -  0.00 32.43 175.04  - - - 
Note: See Table 2 (notes).  P90 net and gross housing wealth (actual) are the same in Italy due to outright ownership. 
 
 
  
33 
 
Table 6: DFL decompositions of cross country differences in inequality of different wealth components 
 Net financial wealth  Gross financial wealth  Financial debt 
UK Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini 
 Actual 74.80 22.68 0.99  65.18 19.54 0.80  66.93 18.45 0.83 
Finland            
Actual 93.50 38.88 1.39  66.35 26.93 0.79  72.88 28.83 0.86 
Counterfactual  76.76 27.17 1.14  60.09 20.54 0.75  75.65 28.28 0.87 
Italy             
Actual 66.53 28.93 0.81  64.34 27.89 0.77  98.11 33.27 0.94 
Counterfactual  65.98 29.21 0.79  64.09 28.25 0.76  97.96 34.59 0.94 
US SCF             
Actual 91.12 51.38 1.02  83.76 47.14 0.90  57.15 22.53 0.76 
Counterfactual  93.08 44.35 1.08  81.32 38.68 0.88  53.97 14.58 0.75 
US PSID             
Actual 88.43 41.65 1.02  80.77 38.21 0.88  69.07 26.37 0.83 
Counterfactual  91.30 45.40 1.02  85.11 42.15 0.91  72.24 25.74 0.85 
Sweden            
Actual - - -  62.47 23.29 0.78  - - - 
Counterfactual  - - -  62.62 24.17 0.81  - - - 
 Net housing wealth  Gross housing wealth  Housing debt 
UK Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini 
 Actual 43.85 9.95 0.65  38.59 8.77 0.58  50.87 11.90 0.76 
Finland            
Actual 42.42 11.59 0.64  39.02 10.35 0.59  66.39 13.43 0.84 
Counterfactual  39.96 10.92 0.59  37.23 9.67 0.55  73.38 13.59 0.83 
Italy             
Actual 41.28 10.09 0.61  40.70 9.93 0.60  99.95 32.29 0.95 
Counterfactual  43.12 10.33 0.63  42.45 10.11 0.62  99.90 27.76 0.95 
US SCF             
Actual 61.22 25.17 0.76  54.12 20.94 0.70  55.61 17.01 0.77 
Counterfactual  55.45 21.02 0.73  48.64 17.49 0.67  57.11 14.65 0.80 
US PSID             
Actual 56.27 20.54 0.74  47.43 15.61 0.67  50.09 10.89 0.75 
Counterfactual  54.09 17.80 0.74  47.51 14.35 0.68  60.41 11.47 0.81 
Sweden            
Actual - - -  47.73 12.78 0.70  - - - 
Counterfactual  - - -  46.83 13.76 0.68  - - - 
Note: See Table 2 (notes).  
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Table 7: Actual and counterfactual inequality measures for NW1 and NW2 and the role of educational loans  
 NW1  NW2  
 
NW1  
Excluding 
educational  
loans  
 NW2  
Excluding 
educational loans  
 Gini Top 1%  Gini Top 1%  Gini  Top 1%  Gini
  
Top 1% 
UK            
 Actual 0.66 9.98  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Finland            
Actual 0.68 13.03  n.a. n.a.  0.67 12.92  n.a. n.a. 
Counterfactual  0.61 11.28  n.a. n.a.  0.61 11.22  n.a. n.a. 
Italy             
Actual 0.60 10.76  0.62 12.26  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Counterfactual  0.62 11.57  0.64 12.14  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
US SCF             
Actual 0.83 32.68  0.85 37.46  0.82 32.43  0.85 37.25 
Counterfactual  0.81 27.39  0.82 30.46  0.80 27.02  0.81 29.99 
US PSID             
Actual 0.80 25.24  0.82 30.33  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Counterfactual  0.81 26.04  0.81 27.07  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Sweden            
Actual 0.89 17.52  0.86 17.34  0.83 16.57  0.80 16.53 
Counterfactual  0.85 17.77  0.82 17.31  0.80 17.12  0.79 16.76 
Note: NW1 and NW2 are the two net worth measures which excludes and includes business equity respectively.  NW2 measure is 
available only for a subset of datasets. All other notes as in Table 2. 
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Figure 1 
Cross country differences in net worth distributions  
 
Note: The figure reflects wealth up to the 98th percentile.  
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Figure 2 
Actual and counterfactual net worth distributions  
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Table A1: Mean and various percentiles of household net worth
1
 by country, thousands 2005 Euros
2 
 Mean P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 N 
        
UK 116.7 -0.3 2.2 62.3 150.0 302.7 3988 
Finland 66.5 -2.7 0.7 41.0 89.4 159.7 3893 
Italy 163.6 0.0 15.9 104.0 212.2 369.2 8010 
US SCF  207.0 -6.3 0.3 42.4 155.6 418.4 4442 
US PSID  158.1 -3.9 0.2 40.9 150.0 368.1 5550 
Sweden  50.9 -13.1 -0.7 15.9 69.9 151.5 17819 
Notes: (1) Net worth (NW1) equal to the sum of net financial assets (TFA1) and housing equity (TNF1). Net financial assets 
equal to total financial assets (TFA1) minus financial debt - non-housing debt (NHD) in LWS wording. Housing equity 
equals to the sum of own principal residence, investment real estate (TNF1) minus mortgage debt. (2) All monetary values 
are expressed in 2005 Euros (Euro 16 ppp). 
Source: Own calculations based on LWS database.  
 
Table A2: Cross-country differences in the distribution of various demographic characteristics 
 UK Finland Italy US SCF US PSID Sweden  
Age of household head       
16-24 3.83 7.26 0.68 5.59 5.25 6.61 
25-34 14.29 16.70 9.40 17.14 18.63 16.91 
35-44 19.29 19.97 21.47 22.31 22.16 17.73 
45-54 17.37 21.00 18.80 20.61 22.40 17.51 
55-64 14.89 13.81 16.90 13.24 12.55 16.57 
65-74 14.02 11.73 18.21 10.77 10.92 10.87 
75-84 12.01 7.70 11.66 8.31 6.32 9.72 
85+ 4.29 1.82 2.88 2.03 1.79 4.07 
Household type       
Single no children 30.13 38.99 23.29 28.61 33.04 48.06 
Single with children 7.50 4.79 1.31 9.93 8.11 5.57 
Single with other adults 8.90 4.37 9.66 1.74 5.18 2.21 
Couple no children 25.02 25.67 20.35 30.16 23.11 23.11 
Couple with children 20.42 21.88 26.45 26.78 25.06 17.82 
Couple with other adults  8.02 4.30 18.94 2.78 5.50 3.23 
Working status of household head        
Working  54.17 58.00 49.09 72.31 70.55 65.61 
Unemployed-inactive 14.29 11.94 10.35 9.73 10.65 5.80 
Retired 31.55 30.07 40.56 17.96 18.8 28.58 
Educational attainment of household head        
Low  52.04 37.91 36.19 47.71 48.34 22.71 
Mid  35.64 49.81 55.80 22.76 22.65 54.03 
High  12.33 12.28 8.01 29.54 29.00 23.26 
Home-ownership status        
% of homeowners 70.15 68.30 72.22 69.42 65.38 57.24 
Income        
Mean income by income quartile group         
Bottom  6,533 6,875 5,942 7,301 9,326 7,571 
2
nd
  12,147 10,864 10,438 14,928 19,403 12,199 
3
rd
  17,730 14,685 15,240 24,101 29,174 16,651 
Top  31,641 22,330 27,597 59,638 60,647 25,617 
     Mean  17,025 13,511 14,739 25,644 29,343 15,420 
     Median 14,651 12,709 12,495 18,617 24,045 14,225 
Gini  0.34 0.27 0.33 0.49 0.41 0.27 
Number of households  4,185 3,893 8,010 4,442 5,834 17,953 
Note: The sample includes households with non-zero weight with non-missing information on net worth. Sample size may 
differ for different variables because of missing values. Household weights are used. The Swedish survey does not record 
education for persons older than 75 years old.   
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Table A3: Mean and median net worth by country and household characteristics (thousands 2005 Euros) 
 Mean net worth  Median net worth 
 UK Finland Italy US SCF US PSID Sweden  UK Finland Italy US SCF US PSID Sweden 
Age of household head              
16-24 12.5 5.7 86.2 28.8 2.8 5.0  -0.2 0.3 13.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
25-34 44.9 23.0 92.5 36.8 29.2 12.1  12.4 1.0 47.7 1.3 1.0 0.0 
35-44 100.3 56.2 135.5 113.4 106.5 35.6  47.7 40.4 93.4 27.4 26.8 8.0 
45-54 136.1 86.8 196.2 234.4 189.6 58.1  88.8 65.2 135.8 61.1 61.4 23.7 
55-64 178.2 106.9 221.5 364.3 258.8 81.6  114.8 76.2 144.1 87.1 112.8 46.3 
65-74 170.6 93.1 177.8 402.3 302.1 87.9  103.6 59.7 105.6 118.0 151.0 52.6 
     75-84 119.5 78.2 129.7 338.0 255.8 69.7  79.5 49.6 79.6 119.6 126.1 34.8 
      85+ 62.5 59.3 118.6 287.0 155.9 53.7  30.3 27.1 43.8 101.3 97.4 18.4 
Household types              
Single no children  81.3 39.8 93.5 133.5 91.1 28.9  27.2 14.7 53.0 24.7 9.7 4.7 
Single with children 59.3 22.4 98.4 37.8 28.8 16.1  4.7 1.0 53.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Single with adults  116.9 69.9 159.4 64.4 105.4 50.1  65.4 49.3 89.1 25.5 31.2 21.8 
Couple no children 165.8 101.1 189.0 354.3 302.6 91.1  102.1 66.2 112.3 99.7 124.7 58.8 
Couple with children 111.1 71.7 167.2 180.7 161.4 59.5  54.7 55.0 111.9 34.5 43.8 25.0 
Couples with adults 177.5 120.6 224.2 313.9 175.9 101.7  122.8 89.7 160.7 98.4 112.8 66.9 
Household head working status             
    Working 117.3 72.8 168.9 181.5 139.2 48.4  61.7 47.6 111.4 32.4 31.2 14.2 
     Unemployed/inactive 64.1 14.1 146.1 94.9 55.6 8.0  1.0 0.1 69.0 0.8 0.5 -1.4 
     Retired 139.3 75.1 161.7 370.3 283.4 65.2  86.7 53.3 101.3 128.0 146.1 29.5 
Education  of  household head              
   Low  89.4 56.2 111.7 85.1 82.2 39.4  45.4 43.2 74.3 19.9 19.5 13.0 
   Mid  135.4 56.8 174.3 148.7 130.0 41.1  76.7 30.6 116.7 33.0 38.0 9.3 
   High  177.6 137.6 323.4 448.9 306.6 75.0  95.3 84.9 217.5 118.0 104.2 28.1 
Homeownership               
  Non-home owners 5.1 -2.5 13.5 6.2 7.8 1.1  0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Homeowners  164.8 98.5 221.3 295.5 235.4 87.7  106.3 68.6 154.9 91.3 99.3 54.4 
Income               
Bottom  92.6 39.4 90.4 85.5 102.4 27.4  43.3 6.1 52.8 1.7 1.5 3.1 
2
nd
  79.4 48.3 120.4 97.2 86.8 34.2  28.6 31.7 84.9 18.6 19.5 7.6 
3
rd
  109.6 61.6 162.7 122.8 129.8 45.0  60.0 48.6 119.9 50.5 46.8 18.4 
Top  182.9 105.8 282.4 415.4 298.0 92.6  109.1 78.3 195.2 142.0 129.5 53.9 
Note: The sample includes households with non-missing data on net worth and the various variables used in the decomposition analysis. Household weights are used.
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Decomposition results using US (SCF) as a base country 
 
Table A4: DFL decomposition of the distribution of net worth (figures in thousands of 2005 Euros) - 
using US as a base country  
 P10 P25 P50 P90 P95 
US SCF       
Actual -6.30 0.27 42.37 418.40 700.45 
Finland      
Actual -2.66 0.73 40.99 159.66 222.78 
Counterfactual  0.00 22.60 81.23 328.66 425.46 
Italy       
Actual 0.00 15.91 103.96 369.15 533.36 
Counterfactual  2.12 19.09 117.96 554.79 843.02 
UK      
 Actual -0.29 2.24 62.26 302.65 439.86 
Counterfactual  -0.33 5.78 71.50 361.13 544.00 
US PSID       
Actual -3.90 0.19 40.90 368.14 613.57 
Counterfactual  -3.90 0.01 34.09 371.07 662.29 
Sweden      
Actual -13.12 -0.69 15.92 151.46 215.28 
Counterfactual  -15.57 -0.09 31.36 252.88 413.82 
      
Note: Counterfactual distributional statistics are estimated using the DFL decomposition re-weighting 
procedure. The explanatory variables included in the reweighting function include age education and working 
status of the household head, household structure, and household income net of capital gains and interest 
payments. All counterfactual distributions are estimated using US (SCF) as a base country i.e. they represent 
the distribution that would prevail in each of the countries if the distribution of characteristics was similar to the 
UK. The sample is restricted to households with non-missing data on wealth and key variables that are required 
to estimate the weighting function.   
 
Table A5: DFL decomposition of net worth inequality- using US as a base country  
 P90/50 P25/50 Gini Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% 
US SCF        
Actual 9.88 0.01 0.83 70.30 57.31 32.68 
Finland       
Actual 3.90 0.02 0.68 45.34 31.19 13.03 
Counterfactual  4.04 0.30 0.64 45.59 32.83 11.19 
Italy        
Actual 3.55 0.15 0.60 42.07 28.64 10.76 
Counterfactual  4.70 0.16 0.62 42.37 27.58 9.48 
UK       
 Actual 4.86 0.04 0.66 45.36 29.83 9.98 
Counterfactual  5.05 0.08 0.66 46.22 30.73 8.75 
US PSID        
Actual 9.00 0.00 0.80 63.47 48.61 25.24 
Counterfactual  10.89 0.00 0.83 68.69 54.40 31.16 
Sweden       
Actual 9.51 -0.04 0.89 58.10 40.53 17.52 
Counterfactual  8.06 -0.00 0.87 62.68 46.34 13.67 
       
Note: Counterfactual distributional statistics are estimated using the DFL decomposition re-weighting procedure. The 
explanatory variables included in the reweighting function include age, education and working status of the household head, 
household structure, and household income net of capital gains and interest payments.  All counterfactual distributions are 
estimated using the US (SCF) as a base country i.e. they represent the distribution that would prevail in each of the countries 
if the distribution of characteristics was similar to the US (SCF).  The sample is restricted to households with non-missing 
data on wealth and key variables that are required to estimate the weighting function.    
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Table A6: Wealth (level) OLS regressions (thousands 2005 Euros) 
 
UK 
 
Finland 
 
Italy 
 
US 
SCF  
US 
PSID  
Sweden 
 Age of household head 
         
 25-34 4.119 
 
-4.133 
 
-20.7 
 
-58.03 ** -35.83 *** -15.82 *** 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(-0.85) 
 
(-0.92) 
 
(-2.68) 
 
(-3.54) 
 
(-6.35) 
 35-44 55.56 *** 28.66 *** 8.543 
 
-37.69 
 
34.99 ** -0.215 
 
 
(-6.17) 
 
(-4.79) 
 
(-0.38) 
 
(-1.68) 
 
(-2.9) 
 
(-0.07) 
 45-54 94.54 *** 55.17 *** 66.73 ** 48.75 
 
99.85 * 17.22 *** 
 
(-10.04) 
 
(-9.14) 
 
(-2.91) 
 
(-1.78) 
 
(-2.29) 
 
(-4.93) 
 55-64 155.4 *** 98.38 *** 131.9 *** 187.6 *** 156.8 *** 43.03 *** 
 
(-12.61) 
 
(-10.6) 
 
(-4.83) 
 
(-5.95) 
 
(-4.39) 
 
(-11.22) 
 65-74 171.8 *** 107.4 *** 154.2 *** 282.8 *** 217.3 *** 74.59 *** 
 
(-7.09) 
 
(-6.3) 
 
(-4.77) 
 
(-6.56) 
 
(-4.48) 
 
(-13.27) 
 75-84 136.6 *** 103.8 *** 148.1 *** 272.5 *** 225.4 *** 64.84 *** 
 
(-6.69) 
 
(-5.87) 
 
(-4.57) 
 
(-5.45) 
 
(-4.49) 
 
(-11.07) 
 85+ 91.21 *** 87.7 *** 158.1 *** 278.2 *** 126.7 ** 55.41 *** 
 
(-4.26) 
 
(-4.09) 
 
(-4.53) 
 
(-3.47) 
 
(-2.93) 
 
(-9.29) 
 Household types 
          
 Single no 
children 
-49.31 *** -39.44 *** -64.28 *** -128.6 *** -142.2 *** -30.53 *** 
 
(-6.08) 
 
(-7.23) 
 
(-6.56) 
 
(-5.80) 
 
(-5.89) 
 
(-9.63) 
 Lone parent -7.746 
 
-39.41 *** -10.61 
 
-6.842 
 
-96.37 *** -10.73 * 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(-5.34) 
 
(-0.68) 
 
(-0.35) 
 
(-4.81) 
 
(-2.51) 
 Single with 
adults 
-15.15 
 
-20.05 * -25.26 
 
-68.89 * -120.8 *** -16.17 ** 
 
(-1.31) 
 
(-2.08) 
 
(-1.83) 
 
(-2.24) 
 
(-4.42) 
 
(-3.17) 
 Couple with 
children  
20.37 * -10.66 
 
28.73 * 24.07 
 
-25.01 
 
9.765 
* 
 
(-2.12) 
 
(-1.56) 
 
(-2.28) 
 
(-1.19) 
 
(-0.72) 
 
(-2.46) 
 Couple with 
adults  
7.598 
 
5.652 
 
-1.422 
 
24.18 
 
-128.5 *** 5.575 
 
 
(-0.57) 
 
(-0.51) 
 
(-0.11) 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(-4.27) 
 
(-0.96) 
 Household head working status 
        
 Unemployed–
inactive 
11.57 
 
21.93 *** -32.46 
 
17.48 
 
33.3 
 
7.619 
 
 
(-1.17) 
 
(-3.31) 
 
(-1.67) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
(-1.56) 
 
(-1.74) 
 Retired  32.1 
 
-1.208 
 
-42.59 
 
20.09 
 
68.6 
 
9.033 
 
 
(-1.74) 
 
(-0.11) 
 
(-1.59) 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(-1.86) 
 
(-1.56) 
 Education of household head 
        
 Low -56.84 *** -27.9 *** -77.13 *** -32.15 * -65.39 *** -14.75 *** 
 
(-8.12) 
 
(-4.84) 
 
(-8.32) 
 
(-2.27) 
 
(-4.22) 
 
(-6.40) 
 High 29.65 * 45.89 *** 87.17 *** 211.7 *** 109.1 ** 15.73 *** 
 
(-2.41) 
 
(-5.22) 
 
(-4.09) 
 
(-8.64) 
 
(-2.85) 
 
(-5.18) 
 Household income 
          
 Income<0 62.12 * 519.7 ** -5.311 
 
2688 *** 388.4 ** 339.7 *** 
 
(-2.13) 
 
(-2.82) 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(-6.68) 
 
(-3.27) 
 
(-3.9) 
 Decile 1 29.25 * 18.62 
 
-9.524 
 
40.02 
 
50.19 * 11.32 * 
 
(-2.42) 
 
(-1.58) 
 
(-0.79) 
 
(-1.38) 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-1.97) 
 Decile 2 -7.275 
 
-5.909 
 
-15.69 
 
-34.79 * 84.45 
 
-12.36 *** 
 
(-0.61) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
(-1.58) 
 
(-2.09) 
 
(-0.98) 
 
(-3.88) 
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Table A6: (continued) 
 
Decile 3 -23.17 * -1.588 
 
-6.234 
 
-10.13 
 
18.83 
 
-19.02 *** 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-0.29) 
 
(-0.61) 
 
(-0.55) 
 
(-1.18) 
 
(-5.84) 
 Decile 4 -37.62 *** -3.268 
 
17.72 
 
-20.16 
 
-0.625 
 
-6.095 
 
 
(-3.92) 
 
(-0.60) 
 
(-1.44) 
 
(-1.31) 
 
(-0.05) 
 
(-1.82) 
 Decile 6 7.4 
 
-0.573 
 
29.5 ** -5.805 
 
13.92 
 
5.883 * 
 
(-0.65) 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(-2.76) 
 
(-0.36) 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(-1.99) 
 Decile 7 5.277 
 
-1.432 
 
35.46 ** -4.288 
 
45.89 
 
7.685 * 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(-0.26) 
 
(-3.28) 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(-1.66) 
 
(-2.54) 
 Decile 8 4.464 
 
5.719 
 
63.71 *** -5.618 
 
9.557 
 
15.65 *** 
 
(-0.39) 
 
(-0.85) 
 
(-4.5) 
 
(-0.31) 
 
(-0.53) 
 
(-4.79) 
 Decile 9 46.4 *** 15.03 * 103.6 *** -6.3 
 
43.99 
 
29.64 *** 
 
(-3.46) 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-7.01) 
 
(-0.30) 
 
(-1.85) 
 
(-8.01) 
 Decile 10 128.6 *** 48.95 *** 216.7 *** 508.4 *** 300 
 
74.58 *** 
 
(-6.49) 
 
(-6.19) 
 
(-9.46) 
 
(-11.0) 
 
(-5.05) 
 
(-12.28) 
 Constant 28.83 * 16.97 * 99.88 *** 27.87 
 
51.88 
 
20.77 *** 
 
(-2.39) 
 
(-2.09) 
 
(-3.97) 
 
(-0.66) 
 
(-1.3) 
 
(-3.72) 
 
            
 Obs.  3988 
 
3893 
 
8010 
 
4442 
 
5550 
 
17819 
 R-sq 0.204 
 
0.284 
 
0.172 
 
0.105 
 
0.062 
 
0.085 
 Note: The sample includes households with non-missing data on net worth and the various variables used in the 
decomposition analysis. Household weights are used. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; ***p<0.001, 
**p<0.01, *p<0.1  
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Table A7: Wealth (IHS transformation) regressions  
 
UK 
 
Finland 
 
Italy 
 
US 
SCF  
US 
PSID  
Sweden 
 Age of household head 
         
 25-34 1.541 *** -0.361 
 
0.221 
 
0.475 
 
-0.061 
 
-0.572 *** 
 
(-6.2) 
 
(-1.41) 
 
(-0.44) 
 
(-1.92) 
 
(-0.31) 
 
(-4.24) 
 35-44 2.733 *** 1.283 *** 0.623 
 
1.884 *** 1.5 *** 0.346 * 
 
(-11.14) 
 
(-4.84) 
 
(-1.27) 
 
(-7.69) 
 
(-8.11) 
 
(-2.45) 
 45-54 3.641 *** 2.235 *** 1.138 * 2.773 *** 2.335 *** 1.14 *** 
 
(-15.11) 
 
(-8.77) 
 
(-2.34) 
 
(-11.53) 
 
(-12.63) 
 
(-8.22) 
 55-64 4.115 *** 3.21 *** 1.622 *** 3.68 *** 3.135 *** 2.257 *** 
 
(-16.61) 
 
(-11.53) 
 
(-3.32) 
 
(-14.42) 
 
(-15.28) 
 
(-16.34) 
 65-74 4.585 *** 3.403 *** 1.752 *** 4.48 *** 3.801 *** 3.277 *** 
 
(-16.35) 
 
(-10.29) 
 
(-3.56) 
 
(-16.71) 
 
(-16.95) 
 
(-19.46) 
 75-84 4.561 *** 3.531 *** 1.819 *** 4.713 *** 3.906 *** 3.446 *** 
 
(-15.65) 
 
(-10.41) 
 
(-3.68) 
 
(-16.48) 
 
(-15.15) 
 
(-21.14) 
 85+ 3.974 *** 2.972 *** 1.333 * 5.398 *** 4.200 *** 3.346 *** 
 
(-11.48) 
 
(-5.79) 
 
(-2.48) 
 
(-15.4) 
 
(-13.7) 
 
(-19.75) 
 Household types 
          
 Single no 
children 
-1.057 *** -0.83 *** -0.751 *** -0.708 *** -1.203 *** -0.775 *** 
 
(-9.04) 
 
(-6.25) 
 
(-7.11) 
 
(-5.51) 
 
(-9.60) 
 
(-10.88) 
 Lone parent -0.594 ** -1.332 *** -0.321 
 
-0.361 
 
-0.919 *** -0.482 ** 
 
(-2.89) 
 
(-4.41) 
 
(-1.16) 
 
(-1.76) 
 
(-5.06) 
 
(-3.05) 
 Single with 
adults 
-0.356 * 0.146 
 
-0.24 * 0.052 
 
-1.279 *** -0.657 *** 
 
(-2.07) 
 
(-0.71) 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(-5.50) 
 
(-3.69) 
 Couple with 
children  
0.196 
 
0.312 * 0.249 
 
0.659 *** 0.361 ** 0.388 *** 
 
(-1.47) 
 
(-1.98) 
 
(-1.95) 
 
(-4.47) 
 
(-2.84) 
 
(-4.13) 
 Couple with 
adults  
-0.081 
 
-0.012 
 
0.119 
 
0.251 
 
-0.367 
 
-0.054 
 
 
(-0.53) 
 
(-0.06) 
 
(-1.22) 
 
(-0.83) 
 
(-1.95) 
 
(-0.45) 
 Household head working status 
        
 Unemployed–
inactive 
1.045 *** 1.136 *** 0.119 
 
0.242 
 
0.423 ** 0.656 *** 
 
(-7.37) 
 
(-4.91) 
 
(-0.82) 
 
(-1.28) 
 
(-3.00) 
 
(-4.62) 
 Retired  0.985 *** 0.826 ** 0.302 * 0.82 *** 1.065 *** 0.719 *** 
 
(-5.01) 
 
(-3.00) 
 
(-2.14) 
 
(-3.59) 
 
(-5.92) 
 
(-4.19) 
 Education of household head 
        
 Low -0.819 *** -0.327 * -0.492 *** -0.11 
 
-0.39 *** -0.322 *** 
 
(-8.88) 
 
(-2.56) 
 
(-5.72) 
 
(-0.86) 
 
(-3.59) 
 
(-4.39) 
 High 0.0871 
 
0.368 
 
0.581 *** 0.796 *** 0.118 
 
-0.0785 
 
 
(-0.63) 
 
(-2.38) 
 
(-5.17) 
 
(-5.42) 
 
(-0.91) 
 
(-0.96) 
 Household income 
          
 Income<0 1.726 *** 2.429 *** 0.811 
 
3.212 *** 1.642 *** 1.609 ** 
 
(-3.55) 
 
(-8.02) 
 
(-1.51) 
 
(-7.14) 
 
(-3.49) 
 
(-2.61) 
 Decile 1 0.591 ** -0.2 
 
-0.715 *** -0.58 * -0.502 * -0.064 
 
 
(-2.96) 
 
(-0.70) 
 
(-4.02) 
 
(-2.47) 
 
(-2.42) 
 
(-0.46) 
 Decile 2 -0.052 
 
-0.473 
 
-0.681 *** -1.187 *** -0.644 ** -0.5 *** 
 
(-0.26) 
 
(-1.80) 
 
(-4.23) 
 
(-5.30) 
 
(-3.27) 
 
(-4.15) 
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Table A7: (continued) 
 
Decile 3 -0.411 * -0.156 
 
-0.112 
 
-0.475 * -0.187 
 
-0.914 *** 
 
(-2.12) 
 
(-0.66) 
 
(-0.77) 
 
(-2.15) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(-7.58) 
 Decile 4 -0.487 * -0.301 
 
0.017 
 
-0.54 * -0.108 
 
-0.277 * 
 
(-2.55) 
 
(-1.29) 
 
(-0.11) 
 
(-2.35) 
 
(-0.55) 
 
(-2.28) 
 Decile 6 0.367 * 0.141 
 
0.262 
 
0.325 
 
0.574 ** 0.233 
 
 
(-2.02) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
(-1.61) 
 
(-1.48) 
 
(-2.96) 
 
(-1.87) 
 Decile 7 0.203 
 
0.254 
 
0.408 ** 0.486 * 0.677 ** 0.375 ** 
 
(-1.07) 
 
(-1.16) 
 
(-2.88) 
 
(-2.11) 
 
(-3.24) 
 
(-3.01) 
 Decile 8 0.534 ** 0.548 * 0.622 *** 0.946 *** 0.942 *** 0.803 *** 
 
(-2.95) 
 
(-2.56) 
 
(-4.2) 
 
(-4.13) 
 
(-4.72) 
 
(-6.39) 
 Decile 9 0.986 *** 0.868 *** 1.036 *** 1.067 *** 1.637 *** 1.086 *** 
 
(-5.47) 
 
(-4.21) 
 
(-7.58) 
 
(-4.6) 
 
(-8.44) 
 
(-8.43) 
 Decile 10 1.505 *** 1.281 *** 1.314 *** 2.467 *** 2.24 *** 1.572 *** 
 
(-7.97) 
 
(-6.35) 
 
(-9.23) 
 
(-11.59) 
 
(-10.82) 
 
(-12.22) 
 
Constant 
-
0.0803  
0.554 
 
3.155 *** -0.089 
 
0.854 ** 0.311 
 
 
(-0.29) 
 
(-1.82) 
 
(-6.32) 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(-3.20) 
 
(-1.64) 
 
            
 Obs.  3988 
 
3893 
 
8010 
 
4442 
 
5550 
 
17819 
 R-sq 0.291 
 
0.343 
 
0.183 
 
0.381 
 
0.366 
 
0.231 
 Note: The sample includes households with non-missing data on net worth and the various variables used in the 
decomposition analysis. Household weights are used. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; ***p<0.001, 
**p<0.01, *p<0.1 
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Table A8: DFL decomposition of the distribution of net worth (figures in thousands of 2005 Euros)  
 P10 P25 P50 P90 P95 
UK      
 Actual -0.29 2.24 62.26 302.65 439.86 
Finland      
Actual -2.66 0.73 40.99 159.66 222.78 
Counterfactual  -0.48 9.90 59.93 210.21 284.13 
 % Explained 92 607 89 35 28 
Italy       
Actual 0.00 15.91 103.96 369.15 533.36 
Counterfactual  0.26 12.73 98.97 376.07 554.79 
 % Explained -90 23 12 -10 -23 
US SCF       
Actual -6.30 0.27 42.37 418.40 700.45 
Counterfactual  -6.17 0.11 31.98 312.68 505.58 
 % Explained 2 -8 -52 91 75 
US PSID       
Actual -3.90 0.19 40.90 368.14 613.57 
Counterfactual  -3.41 0.00 28.24 302.79 516.18 
 % Explained 14 -9 -59 100 56 
Sweden      
Actual -13.12 -0.69 15.92 151.46 215.28 
Counterfactual  -12.72 -0.09 24.33 175.65 255.69 
 % Explained 3 20 18 16 18 
      
Note: Counterfactual distributional statistics are estimated using the DFL decomposition re-weighting 
procedure. The explanatory variables included in the reweighting function include age, education and working 
status of the household head, household structure, and household income net of capital gains and interest 
payments. All counterfactual distributions are estimated using UK as a base country i.e. they represent the 
distribution that would prevail in each of the countries if the distribution of characteristics was similar to the 
UK. The sample is restricted to households with non-missing data on wealth and key variables that are required 
to estimate the weighting function.   
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Table A9: DFL decomposition of difference in the distribution of different wealth components for owners only 
 Net financial wealth  Gross financial wealth  Financial debt 
UK P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90 
 Actual -0.43 4.16 72.23  1.45 8.32 82.34  0.80 3.61 19.07 
Finland            
Actual -0.82 1.62 28.25  0.65 3.23 30.87  1.94 4.84 20.99 
Counterfactual  0.04 3.23 40.94  1.13 5.33 41.96  2.42 5.33 24.22 
Italy             
Actual 3.18 9.55 58.34  4.24 10.61 60.60  2.55 5.30 15.91 
Counterfactual  3.18 10.61 58.34  4.24 10.72 60.99  2.33 5.30 15.91 
US SCF             
Actual -5.01 1.58 158.26  1.46 7.44 169.47  1.95 7.93 31.24 
Counterfactual  -5.97 0.76 108.11  0.98 4.87 119.85  1.66 7.14 29.22 
US PSID             
Actual -2.14 2.92 144.14  1.56 7.79 152.91  1.95 4.87 27.27 
Counterfactual  -1.89 1.95 121.74  0.97 4.87 132.45  1.17 4.58 22.40 
Sweden            
Actual - - -  2.34 9.02 63.45  - - - 
Counterfactual  - - -  2.98 12.08 81.05  - - - 
 Net housing wealth  Gross housing wealth  Housing debt 
UK P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90 
 Actual 49.11 92.45 288.90  82.34 130.01 332.24  36.11 57.78 124.23 
Finland            
Actual 35.52 61.35 163.05  48.43 72.65 177.58  10.49 24.22 63.86 
Counterfactual  40.36 72.65 201.79  48.43 82.96 209.87  12.27 27.12 64.57 
Italy             
Actual 79.56 133.66 376.58  84.86 142.15 384.00  9.55 26.52 79.56 
Counterfactual  79.56 133.66 424.31  84.86 148.51 424.31  10.61 31.82 82.74 
US SCF             
Actual 31.17 77.14 325.85  73.04 126.61 425.60  34.09 71.56 187.97 
Counterfactual  29.22 68.18 261.11  63.50 97.39 316.52  26.30 57.46 140.05 
US PSID             
Actual 34.09 77.91 292.18  77.91 132.45 374.96  38.96 70.12 175.31 
Counterfactual  31.17 73.04 267.83  63.31 107.13 311.65  29.22 58.44 136.35 
Sweden            
Actual - - -  35.76 68.95 195.95  - - - 
Counterfactual  - - -  40.98 75.97 219.18  - - - 
 Net worth  Total gross wealth  Total debt 
UK P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90  P25  P50 P90 
 Actual 7.92 70.20 316.93  54.31 115.56 364.47  5.06 39.06 118.31 
Finland            
Actual 1.29 43.02 161.43  6.46 59.68 176.05  4.26 12.91 59.41 
Counterfactual  13.24 62.24 211.83  27.12 75.31 225.57  5.65 17.43 61.36 
Italy             
Actual 35.75 112.02 382.92  42.96 118.73 396.73  4.24 9.55 63.65 
Counterfactual  25.99 107.56 394.61  29.70 110.41 416.15  4.24 10.61 78.50 
US SCF             
Actual 1.16 48.66 430.96  19.56 102.07 537.60  7.79 37.98 163.62 
Counterfactual  0.63 38.18 322.74  13.01 86.19 377.10  5.26 23.83 129.68 
US PSID             
Actual 2.82 51.62 389.86  18.50 114.44 472.35  7.79 42.85 159.72 
Counterfactual  1.02 42.07 333.08  10.03 88.14 394.44  3.90 23.37 116.87 
Sweden            
Actual -1.29 19.28 155.75  11.66 55.39 209.44  6.24 20.02 91.26 
Counterfactual  -0.46 28.58 181.01  19.62 70.40 248.14  6.64 23.25 104.47 
Note: Counterfactual distributional statistics are estimated using the DFL decomposition re-weighting procedure. The explanatory 
variables included in the reweighting function include age, education and working status of the household head, household structure, 
and household income net of capital gains and interest payments. All counterfactual distributions are estimated using UK as a base 
country.  The sample is restricted to households with non-missing data on wealth and key variables that are required to estimate the 
weighting function.    
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Table A10: DFL decomposition of difference in inequality of different wealth components for owners only 
 Net financial wealth  Gross financial wealth  Financial debt 
UK Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini 
 Actual 71.00 20.82 0.96  59.51 16.97 0.75  44.61 11.74 0.64 
Finland            
Actual 92.03 38.06 1.38  64.50 26.11 0.77  51.57 16.67 0.63 
Counterfactual  75.08 26.56 1.13  58.31 20.18 0.74  50.20 15.09 0.62 
Italy             
Actual 62.57 26.15 0.76  60.18 25.21 0.71  36.64 10.50 0.50 
Counterfactual  62.54 27.13 0.75  60.14 26.24 0.71  37.70 6.04 0.51 
US SCF             
Actual 90.26 50.77 1.01  82.38 45.68 0.89  47.25 19.21 0.63 
Counterfactual  91.83 44.35 1.08  79.49 38.68 0.87  41.88 11.26 0.60 
US PSID             
Actual 86.03 39.81 1.00  77.39 35.52 0.86  53.19 18.71 0.67 
Counterfactual  88.34 43.99 1.00  80.89 39.54 0.88  52.02 15.56 0.67 
Sweden            
Actual - - -  56.92 21.17 0.72  - - - 
Counterfactual  - - -  57.30 21.73 0.72  - - - 
 Net housing wealth  Gross housing wealth  Housing debt 
UK Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini 
 Actual 35.26 7.54 0.49  31.30 6.86 0.40  28.11 6.36 0.39 
Finland            
Actual 34.18 9.50 0.47  31.19 8.31 0.41  29.02 5.26 0.44 
Counterfactual  34.29 9.28 0.46  31.72 8.18 0.42  28.66 4.30 0.43 
Italy             
Actual 34.52 8.21 0.46  33.86 7.85 0.45  32.76 3.47 0.50 
Counterfactual  35.01 8.26 0.47  34.26 7.71 0.46  27.76 2.45 0.48 
US SCF             
Actual 53.67 21.16 0.66  47.04 17.62 0.57  38.21 10.89 0.50 
Counterfactual  46.59 17.51 0.60  40.59 14.83 0.51  32.54 8.40 0.46 
US PSID             
Actual 46.85 16.87 0.60  38.90 12.77 0.49  28.75 6.54 0.42 
Counterfactual  42.65 14.14 0.57  37.02 11.57 0.48  27.30 4.95 0.41 
Sweden            
Actual - - -  34.87 9.53 0.48  - - - 
Counterfactual  - - -  36.07 11.03 0.49  - - - 
 Net worth  Total gross wealth  Total debt 
UK Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini  Top 10%  Top 1% Gini 
 Actual 43.61 9.48 0.64  36.90 7.85 0.53  34.84 8.21 0.56 
Finland            
Actual 44.84 12.71 0.68  39.40 10.95 0.58  38.25 8.26 0.57 
Counterfactual  41.02 11.28 0.62  37.24 9.93 0.55  35.81 7.39 0.56 
Italy             
Actual 40.34 10.27 0.57  39.41 9.99 0.56  50.93 7.99 0.62 
Counterfactual  42.17 10.64 0.59  40.96 10.21 0.57  66.85 2.95 0.61 
US SCF             
Actual 69.51 32.24 0.83  60.53 26.83 0.73  44.33 13.27 0.63 
Counterfactual  63.21 26.91 0.80  53.73 22.18 0.69  40.94 10.17 0.63 
US PSID             
Actual 61.69 24.75 0.79  51.42 19.65 0.67  36.20 8.10 0.57 
Counterfactual  61.80 24.08 0.78  53.00 20.77 0.68  36.44 7.38 0.59 
Sweden            
Actual 56.67 17.10 0.88  41.95 12.37 0.60  43.39 12.77 0.61 
Counterfactual  54.79 17.35 0.83  42.11 11.61 0.59  45.20 13.52 0.62 
Note: Counterfactual distributional statistics are estimated using the DFL decomposition re-weighting procedure. The explanatory 
variables included in the reweighting function include age, education and working status of the household head, household structure, 
and household income net of capital gains and interest payments.  All counterfactual distributions are estimated using UK as a base 
country.  The sample is restricted to households with non-missing data on wealth and key variables that are required to estimate the 
weighting function.  
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Table A11: DFL decomposition of the distribution of net worth (figures in thousands of 2005 Euros) – including US-
SCF all available wealth components 
 P10 P25 P50 P90 P95 
UK      
 Actual -0.29 2.24 62.26 302.65 439.86 
Finland      
Actual -2.66 0.73 40.99 159.66 222.78 
Counterfactual  -0.48 9.90 59.93 210.21 284.13 
Italy       
Actual 0.00 15.91 103.96 369.15 533.36 
Counterfactual  0.26 12.73 98.97 376.07 554.79 
US SCF       
Actual -6.30 0.27 42.37 418.40 700.45 
Counterfactual  -6.17 0.11 31.98 312.68 505.58 
US SCF (all available wealth 
components) 
     
Actual 0 9.25 70.56 567.33 998.27 
Counterfactual  0 7.38 53.99 392.18 643.18 
US PSID       
Actual -3.90 0.19 40.90 368.14 613.57 
Counterfactual  -3.41 0.00 28.24 302.79 516.18 
Sweden      
Actual -13.12 -0.69 15.92 151.46 215.28 
Counterfactual  -12.72 -0.09 24.33 175.65 255.69 
      
Note: Counterfactual distributional statistics are estimated using the DFL decomposition re-weighting procedure. The explanatory 
variables included in the reweighting function include age, education and working status of the household head, household structure, 
and household income net of capital gains and interest payments. All counterfactual distributions are estimated using UK as a base 
country i.e. they represent the distribution that would prevail in each of the countries if the distribution of characteristics was similar 
to the UK. The sample is restricted to households with non-missing data on wealth and key variables that are required to estimate the 
weighting function.   
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Table A12: DFL decomposition of net worth inequality – including US-SCF all available wealth components 
 P90/50 P25/50 Gini Top 
10% 
Top 5% Top 1% 
UK       
 Actual 4.86 0.04 0.66 45.36 29.83 9.98 
Finland       
Actual 3.90 0.02 0.68 45.34 31.19 13.03 
Counterfactual  3.51 0.17 0.62 41.20 28.05 11.28 
Italy        
Actual 3.55 0.15 0.60 42.07 28.64 10.76 
Counterfactual  3.80 0.13 0.62 43.88 29.70 11.58 
US SCF        
Actual 9.88 0.01 0.83 70.30 57.31 32.68 
Counterfactual  9.78 0.00 0.81 64.40 49.75 27.26 
US SCF (all available wealth 
components)       
Actual 8.04 0.131 0.793 67.98 53.81 29.26 
Counterfactual  7.26 0.137 0.761 61.80 47.77 25.61 
US PSID        
Actual 9.00 0.00 0.80 63.47 48.61 25.24 
Counterfactual  10.72 0.00 0.81 64.27 49.42 25.94 
Sweden       
Actual 9.51 -0.04 0.89 58.10 40.53 17.52 
Counterfactual  7.22 0.00 0.85 56.04 40.10 17.77 
       
Note: Counterfactual distributional statistics are estimated using the DFL decomposition re-weighting procedure. The explanatory 
variables included in the reweighting function include age, education and working status of the household head, household structure, 
and household income net of capital gains and interest payments.  All counterfactual distributions are estimated using the UK as a 
base country i.e. they represent the distribution that would prevail in each of the countries if the distribution of characteristics was 
similar to the UK.  The sample is restricted to households with non-missing data on wealth and key variables that are required to 
estimate the weighting function.   
